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Abstract—Location-based services (LBS) are services that po-
sition your mobile phone to provide some context-based service 
for you. Some of these services – called ‘location tracking’ appli-
cations - need frequent updates of the current position to decide 
whether a service should be initiated. Thus, internet-based sys-
tems will continuously collect and process the location in rela-
tionship to a personal context of an identified customer.  This 
paper will present the concept of location as part of a person’s 
identity. I will conceptualize location in information systems and 
relate it to concepts like privacy, geographical information sys-
tems and surveillance. The talk will present how the knowledge 
of a person's private life and identity can be enhanced with data 
mining technologies on location profiles and movement patterns. 
Finally, some first concepts about protecting location information 
to prevent or control location profiling are presented. 
Index Terms—communication systems privacy, location, pri-
vacy,   mobility, profiling, maps, GIS. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
OCATION data at first may seem trivial. Where ever I go, 
there I am. I am, where I am.  Location at first is a tuple of 
coordinates on a two-dimensional or three-dimensional grid, 
defining a position unambiguously, e.g. in the WGS-84 stan-
dard which defines the coordinate grid used on the planet 
Earth [1]. 
A.  Location, Privacy and Identity 
Some assumptions about location and identity seem trivial, 
too: At nighttime, my location usually is in the same place my 
home is in. During work days, my location is in my work-
place. But there is more. Location determines belonging to 
social groups, from which social status can be derived. Soci-
ologist Gary Marx defines location as a part of human being’s 
identity in [2], which has been applied to LBS and privacy in 
[3], where the question of volatility and stability of profile 
information is raised. Sholtz assumed in [4] that there is little 
long-time value in profile information from an economic point 
of view. A risk point of view might be different, though. For-
mally, Gruteser and Grunwald sketched some threats in [5], 
where they postulate that from tracking a person’s frequent 
nighttime location, they can guess her identity by looking it up 
in public phone directories. This will be discussed further 
down in the text. 
B.  Geographical Information Systems (GIS) 
    Combined with geographical information systems (GIS), 
many contexts of a place can be found out about – ranging 
from the neighborhood up to criminality of risk levels of natu-
ral disasters. Michael Curry states concern about this and calls 
for ethical standards in [6]. Recent product deployments like 
‘Google Earth’  put these tools into the hands of the general 
public [7].  Ethically problematic is not only the privacy-
invading character, but also the possibilities to manipulate and 
misinform with maps, as described in [8]. Privacy, GIS and 
positioning technology in combination can be even more inva-
sive, as high lightened in [9]. Technologies involved in such 
privacy threats can be put in these categories: 
•  Position tracking technologies 
•  Data warehouse technologies 
•  Geographical data bases & information systems 
(GIS) 
•  Metadata bases with geo-coded data 
Besides these factors, some a-priori knowledge about contexts 
of everyday life, holidays, social conventions and such can be 
an input to the above information systems. 
C.  Data Mining and its Applications 
Data mining has been defined by many authors. Two defini-
tions are presented here for clarity: 
1.  Knowledge discovery is the nontrivial extraction of 
implicit, previously unknown, and potentially useful 
information from data [10].; 
2.  Data mining is the search for relationships and global 
patterns that exist in large databases, but are `hidden' 
among the vast amounts of data, such as a relation-
ship between patient data and their medical diagno-
sis. These relationships represent valuable knowledge 
about the database and objects in the database and, if 
the database is a faithful mirror, of the real world reg-
istered by the database [11]. 
Data Mining evolved with relational data bases. Most of the 
original data mining work centered on processing relations 
and attributes in such data bases. Classic applications are 
fraud detection in financial or insurance matters or warehouse 
optimization based on customers' preferred buying patterns. 
Threats to privacy from data mining on customer databases 
have been well-discussed. An overview of privacy threats and 
ethical questions in customer data collection and profiling can 
be found in [12]. 
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Figure 1: Map of Fira with location track and time stamps of a hypotheti-
cal  person. 
 
Data mining technologies are now available for different kinds 
of geographic information. Classification of land surfaces 
based on satellite intelligence and mining of meta data layers 
of GIS are two examples. Meta data layers such as crime rate 
and wealth, classified by area, are in use for years to get cus-
tomer scoring and to fight mail-order fraud. Land surveying 
with satellite data might reveal how a farmer cares for his land 
– or whether he uses the right amount of fertilizer. The con-
cept is called “precision farming”. 
D.  Profiling 
Profiling a person is more than just data matching. Roger 
Clarke defines profiling as follows: “Profiling is a data sur-
veillance technique which is little-understood and ill-
documented, but increasingly used. It is a means of generating 
suspects or prospects from within a large population, and 
involves inferring a set of characteristics of a particular class 
of person from past experience, then searching data-holdings 
for individuals with a close fit to that set of characteristics.” 
[13] 
.  
Figure 2: Map of Fira with location track and location marks. 
 
Thus, profiling targets at the selection of candidates out of the 
mass that have particular characteristics, or finding patterns 
over people’s data that can be applied to find similar people. 
As an example for the application of the techniques from 
sections A to D, we take a look at the location track of a hypo-
thetical person’s day on Santorini island. A compressed track 
is shown in Figure 1. For simplicity, the location recordings 
of the person while staying at the same place are noted as a 
time interval. Only selected positions are shown in Figure 1. 
For the start, the position data is time stamped (hence the time 
marks to the right), and then combined with GIS data contain-
ing road information and points of interest to create a map. 
From the road information, we can deduct with high probabil-
ity the preferred roads or paths of the person, as you can spot 
in  Figure 2. Additionally, by noticing that the person was 
using the area marked as “hotel” several times a day, one can 
guess that there must be the person’s home. Looking at the 
time stamps adds more information. When you look at Figure 
1, the information in timestamp 1 and 19 clearly indicates that 
the person sleeps at the hotel location. Also, by observing 
timestamps 3 and 9, the person spends most of the daytime at 
the hotel, too. One can guess that the person either is en em-FIDIS Doctoral Consortium       Post-Proceedings on Profiling     October 2005      Fira, Santorini, Greece 
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ployee of the hotel, or has some event to participate in going 
on. Meal times reveal that for lunch and dinner, the person left 
the hotel to spend time at two locations in the old town. Using 
the POI database on the GIS, we find the candidate restau-
rants. What does this tell about nutrition habits, religion, 
health and budget of the person? And can we buy the credit 
card transaction data for these restaurants from Amex to learn 
more? Also notice the dinner time path was on the edge of the 
cliff, unlike the lunchtime path. The cliff points west into the 
sunset. Was the person alone for the romantic view then? 
Timestamp 16 reveals a long stay at – thanks, GIS – an old 
town dancing club. Dancing obviously went on for a long 
time. So no company on the cliff, most likely. Or bad table 
manners. Or both. Timestamps 17 and 18 indicate slow pro-
gress back to the hotel, compared to the lunchtime progress. Is 
this due to intoxicating beverages, or due to company? Here, 
timestamp 19 does not help. Unfortunately, the full day at the 
hotel can be credited to work, hangover or company alike. 
Only the minibar billing on the credit card will most likely 
tell. 
In this example, we used a time stamped location track, a GIS 
with some POI data, and some commonsense to create a be-
havioral profile of a person. We were able to guess some 
context, and find interfaces to other databases that will elabo-
rate our knowledge. 
II.  CONTEXTUAL LOCATION PROFILING 
A.  Spatial and temporal dimensions of location tracking 
Location data can be analyzed at singular points in space or 
time as well as in intervals of either of them or both. The ex-
tent of analysis happens along the time axis or within geo-
graphic boundaries which I call dimensions. The respective 
gain or information or relating risk for the person being ob-
served differs greatly based on the spatial and temporal di-
mensions. Generally, location tracking applications seem to be 
perceived more threatening than one-time positioning of   
person, as Barkhuus notes in  [14]. A matrix of temporal and 
spatial dimensions is constructed from this in Table 1, where 
the matrix illustrates the kind of information that can be de-
ducted about a person from the respective dimension category. 
B.  Context acquisition from temporal and spatial data 
Personal information can be gained starting from knowledge 
about a person’s identifier (not identity!) and her location 
track by applying temporal and spatial context to it. Temporal 
context is for example a person’s time zone, along with time-
dependant social habits, e.g. lunch breaks, Spanish siesta or 
night shift working. Spatial context can be derived from geo-
graphic information systems, which contain many layers of 
information much more specialized than mapping or naviga-
tion data. As described by Curry [6]  and Monmonnier [9], 
existing GIS data layers include information about crime rates, 
property value, wealth, health, education, employment, race, 
pollution, noise, natural hazards and much more. Context 
acquisition follows an algorithmic scheme I construct in this 
way
1: 
1.  Collect time-coded location data for some time (pref-
erably days or weeks to operate in the two-
dimensional category in Table 1). 
2.  Construct some temporal context of interest (e.g. pri-
vate time vs. job time). 
3.  Check for a geographical pattern of interest in the lo-
cation data track (e.g. places frequently visited, or 
unusual places rarely visited etc.) 
4.  Extract geographic coordinates along with their spa-
tial and temporal information. 
5.  Query geographic information systems about loca-
tions, and extract meta data (e.g. “…is an office 
building"). 
6.  Conclude from temporal context, spatial context and 
geographic meta data, e.g. the workplace, the home 
place, sports, and other personal data. 
Notably, this algorithm works without knowing the person. It 
is enough to be able to re-identify her in the data set. It can be 
used for example on WiFi hot spot or mobile phone tracks that 
leave unique technical parameters as identifiable information. 
Using the algorithm above, we learn much about a - yet un-
known – person’s preferences and frequent behavior. 
Next, the old-fashioned data bases enter the stage. 
C.  Data Mining, Combination and Profiling 
As defined above, data mining follows relations in rela-
tional data bases to find “knowledge”.  Various methods from 
disciplines such as artificial intelligence, statistics, computa-
tional linguistics and stochastic methods are deployed on 
collections of data. Correlation between shopping habits and 
location, communication habits and location, movement and 
health data, social contexts and other can be mined from the 
data bases.  
The application of profiling techniques on geographic and 
data base information could lead to new kinds of marketing, 
insurance or anti-terrorism systems. People’s movement pat-
 
1 The algorithm is inspired by Usama Fayyad’s and  Evangelos Simoudis’ 
knowledge discovery algorithm presented in their 1995 tutorial “Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining“ on the 14th International Joint Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-95). Documentation can be found online at  
www-aig.jpl.nasa.gov/public/kdd95/tutorials/IJCAI95-tutorial.html 
  Spatial dimension 
  At one point  Within an area 
At one 
mo-
ment 
Singular: 
Know about the status 
quo of time and space 
at one moment. 
Spatial snapshot: 
For individuals: Makes 
no sense as one can be in 
one place at one moment 
only. For groups: can 
reveal relation-ships, 
cliques, collaboration. 
Tem-
poral 
di-
men-
sion 
Within 
a time 
window 
Time-linear: 
Can reveal workplace, 
home, social context 
and information about 
personal preferences 
(e.g. restaurant type). 
Two-dimensional: 
Reveals shopping habits, 
dating habits, driving 
speeds and other informa-
tion. 
Table 1: Personal information deductible from temporal 
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terns combined with other features could be used to segment 
customers, generate health insurance conditions or arrest sus-
pects. 
III.  COUNTERMEASURES & SELF-PROTECTION 
The protection against geo-coded data mining and profiling 
has three components: identity protection, camouflage and a 
legal and social framework for technology regulation. Each of 
the items will be discussed below. 
A.  Identity protection 
A person’s identity should be protected while using location-
based services. If the location track is not personalized, it 
cannot be combined with any other data. Furthermore, the 
amount of data than can be accumulated about a person should 
be limited to avoid identity guessing from movement patterns. 
Identity management systems with frequent pseudonym 
changes and anonymous access to services provide to reach 
these goals.  The simplest form of identity management occurs 
in Figure 3, where the mobile operator offers pseudonym 
translation services for the user before the application data 
traffic is forwarded into MIX cascades. 
 
Figure 3: Minimalist Identity Management approach. 
 
More advanced identity management approaches introduce 
policy management. Here, a user can set policy about location 
forwarding at her mobile operator, and at the same time issue 
anonymous credentials that identify the policy. The credential 
then is given to the LBS provider as a voucher  Please note 
that naïve use of pseudonym change mechanisms can reveal 
all your pseudonyms used with a service though, as illustrated 
in Figure 4. To prevent this from happening, MIX-Zoning will 
be discussed later in this text (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 4: Naive pseudonym change reveals pseudonym 
connection. 
B.  Camouflage 
The generation of  less precise or even false information about 
identity, identifiable movement patterns and time or space 
disturbances will provide to protection from unauthorized 
geographic profiling.  Early concepts have been suggested by 
Gruteser and Grunwald in [5]. Concepts include: 
 
•  Temporal cloaking: the time intervals for location 
queries are regulated to avoid micro-measurement of 
a user’s position. The concept is illustrated in Figure 
5. 
 
       Figure 5: Temporal cloaking. 
 
•  Spatial cloaking: the precision of location informa-
tion is reduced to a level tolerable by the application, 
but will not be delivered too precise. This intentional 
degradation of position precision prevents too precise 
information collection about a person’s movements 
when tracking on a high-resolution level. Spatial 
cloaking is illustrated in Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6: Spatial cloaking. 
 
•  MIX-zoning: To allow for unobservable change of 
pseudonyms (and solve the problem from Figure 4), a 
zone of unobservability is created where users can go 
to perform their pseudonym change. As soon as 
many users do this simultaneously, an anonymity set 
is created. The concept is inspired by Chaum’s MIX 
[15]. An example of MIX zoning for the purpose of 
pseudonym change protection is shown in Figure 7. FIDIS Doctoral Consortium       Post-Proceedings on Profiling     October 2005      Fira, Santorini, Greece 
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Figure 7: A MIX zone. 
 
Temporal cloaking adds uncertainty to the point in time the 
position or a person was measured. The relying service using 
the data does receive a position datum, but only knows this is 
not the person’s current position but from some time in the 
past. The usefulness of this approach is limited in terms of 
privacy protection. Only in contexts where a service tracks a 
person frequently (e.g. a pollen warning scenario, as used in 
[16]), but with coarse requirements on resolution and timing, 
temporal cloaking seems applicable. Spatial cloaking is effec-
tive in circumstances where a tracking service doesn’t require 
high-resolution position information (e.g. for pollen warning). 
Here, the information is intentionally degraded to a degree 
where no daily routine is contained anymore. 
Location dummy traffic: MIX zones are effective to protect 
and obfuscate pseudonym changing event. Unfortunately, 
MIX zones might not always have enough people in them just 
at the moment when they are used. To improve on this prob-
lem, the concept of dummy traffic in MIX communication can 
be adapted. Location track dummy traffic is performed with 
dummy users that are artificially generated location tracks 
with a certain non-compromising behaviour. The dummy 
pseudonyms are registered with the LBS application, and will 
be used for pseudonym changes.  
 
Figure 8: Location dummy traffic, Rendez-vous point. 
 
When a user wishes to change to a different pseudonym, the 
dummy system ensures that some of his alternative or dummy 
pseudonyms will cross the user’s path at a rendez-vous point, 
where the change will happen. The now unused pseudonym 
takes up a dummy life of its own, in temporary or permanent 
continuation of the previous path. This mechanism can take up 
a used pseudonym and carry it around the town virtually. The 
challenge here is the generation of realistic movement patterns 
that do not compromise the pseudonym owner by, e.g., enter-
ing the town’s red light district. The application of this protec-
tion measure is restricted to LBS infrastructures that allow for 
injection of artificially created position data (e.g. the GPS 
device scenario or some special instance of the intermediary 
scenario described in [3]). 
C.  Legal and social framework 
Finally, a legal and social framework is required on top of 
technical infrastructures. To make sense of innovations like 
the LBS applications with privacy protection, possibly based 
on trusted platforms that can enforce system constraints, a 
legal and social environment for the technologies must be 
created. Regulation is a controversial topic, but for many 
fields that are problems in other parts of society, there is evi-
dence that regulation does not only complicate markets, but 
also provides to creation of new markets. For an outlook on 
how economic theory can favour regulation of pollution prob-
lems, and possibly the privacy problem, Paul Sholtz presented 
some interesting examples in [17] and [4]. To enable market 
participants to distinguish the quality of systems and parties, a 
public quality certification scheme can prove useful, as Back-
house et al  have found in [18]. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Summarizing the challenges posed by combined data min-
ing and geographic data mining, applied to location tracks, 
infrastructures for location-based applications have to offer 
reliable functionality to prevent misuse of personal informa-
tion. As seen in section III, the development of technical 
countermeasures is in a very early phase of maturity. Like 
research in privacy-enhancing technology, it will take time for 
technology to mature, develop end-user usability and make its 
way into the application systems. With the possible counter-
measures, users will have to rely on other people’s IT systems 
correct functioning. Thus, with the development of geographic 
data mining technologies and LBS, there is a strong need to 
research and specify ways to develop privacy-respecting in-
frastructures (PRI). PRI – unlike the self-protecting focus of 
privacy-enhancing technologies (PET) – should be integrated 
within a regulatory, economic and technological framework. 
Some ideas of possible frameworks have been explored in 
[16] by the deployment of PET on all nodes of a distributed 
LBS scenario under consideration of the existing legal frame-
work and end-user centric research. Generally, data protection 
policy of the future should take trusted platform technology 
under consideration. This form of restrictive computing base 
could ensure correct, fair function of LBS systems and geo-
graphic data bases, and generate assurance with a certification 
system. FIDIS Doctoral Consortium       Post-Proceedings on Profiling     October 2005      Fira, Santorini, Greece 
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